Protecting cryptographic schemes against information leakage
The security of various cryptosystems in common use has been completely compromised by "side channel attacks", namely, by attacks exploiting leakage of information from the underlying secret keys. Such information leakage typically emanates from physical characteristics inevitably involved in real-world implementations of cryptographic protocols (say, power consumption, timing, or electro-magnetic radiation).
In this talk I will discuss leakage resilient cryptography - cryptographic protocols protecting against such side channel attacks. I will focus on the bounded leakage model (introduced in a joint work with Goldwasser and Vaikuntanathan), a model capturing a large class of side channel attacks that has laid the foundations for many follow-up works on leakage resilient cryptography, and will exhibit a public key encryption scheme resilient to such leakage. As time permits I will also discuss extensions of these results to unbounded leakage in distributed settings (based on a joint work with Goldwasser and Hazay).